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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, AppelleeDefendant Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Railroad") respectfully petitions for a
rehearing to address dispositive points of law and fact that the Court has overlooked or
misapprehended in reaching its decision.
INTRODUCTION
The Railroad respectfully submits that the Court has erroneously reversed the
district court's summary judgment against Plaintiff-Appellant Eugene Francisconi on the
claims of defamation, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (The
Railroad does not take issue in this petition with this Court's holding reversing in part the
district court's ruling on Mr. Francisconi's contract claims.) This Court's stated reason
for reversing on these three claims is that the district court improperly engaged in factfinding. With due respect, in regard to these claims the Court's decision has overlooked
or misapprehended (1) the arguments of the Railroad, (2) the undisputed facts, and (3)
the controlling law.
On appeal from summary judgment, the reasons the district court reached its
decision do not determine whether the ultimate ruling was correct. It is well established
that an appellate court may affirm the ruling of a lower court for any legally sufficient
reason, even if the lower court erred in its analysis. This Court appears to have
overlooked this important rule. The decision focuses narrowly on the district court's
alleged error in fact-finding at the summary judgment stage while failing to apprehend
1
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reached below. Contrary to this Court's decision, in other wrords3 there is no need to
engage in any fact-finding or weighing of the evidence to reject these causes of action.
Under Utah law and the undisputed facts, Mr, Francisconi plainly failed to establish key
elemei its of his claims foi defai 1: latioi 1,ftaud, and intei ltioi lal ii if lictic i 1 of e 11 lotional
distress.
Allowing Mr. Francisconi to go to trial on these manifestly defective claims
undermines long-settled Utah law. Respectfully, a rehearing is necessary to correct the
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ARGUMENT
This Court May Affirm the Trial Court's Ruling on Any Proper Ground,
With respect to the defamation, fraud, and emotional distress claims, this Court
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": that h.iMs. the Court held that the district couit had "improperly granted summary
judgment dismissing these claims. /</.
I low c: ' :!:! i egardless of whetl lei tl le distil ::t com 111. t s vv 1 itten 1 1 tin ig suggests ' •
improper wei'/hir.<T ^f the facts, summar 'i^gment on these claims was nevertheless
warranted based upon the controlling legal standards and the undisputed facts. Whether
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or not the district court's written ruling properly articulated why the Raihoad deserves
summary judgment on these claims is not the decisive issue on appeal. It is a basic
principle of appellate law that an appellate court may disagree with the reasoning of the
trial court but still affirm its ultimate ruling on other appropriate grounds. Debry v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("It is well-settled that an appellate court may
affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on
some other ground.").
With due respect, the Court failed to apply this important principle in its decision
and instead simply reversed the ruling below. As demonstrated herein, the Court
overlooked how the law and undisputed facts require the Court to uphold the ruling
(though not the precise grounds) of the district court. The result is that, unless corrected
on rehearing, claims that are legally and factually baseless will now be presented to the
jury.
II.

The Court Overlooked Key Points of Law and Determinative Undisputed
Facts in Reversing Summary Judgment on Mr. Francisconi's Defamation
Claim.
This Court's decision notes that "the district court stated [in its memorandum

decision] that 'truth is a defense to a defamation claim and it is obvious that
[Francisconi] did in fact misuse the [In Lieu Policy] . . . . The [defamatory] statements
were true.'" 2001 UT App, § 16 (quoting district court's Memorandum Decision). The
Court went on to hold that dismissal of the defamation claim could not be based on the
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defense of truth because whether ."*' •:. . ran C t S C 0 1 1 ' 11 i < i *»1 <J i ,:MV, UIC policy is a question
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With due respect, this holding overlooks and misapprehends tl ic prin :ipal k gal
bases and key facts requiring dismissal of the defamation claim. Contrary to the Court's
assumption, the truth of the alleged defamatory statements is not the principal reason for
L;,HL -/.!;.- :.
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irgument was o t r u ^ u a:, ..i. auernaiive argument in the

R ailroad's bi ief See Br. \ ppellee p 36 ("Fi irtl lei n IOI e tl le staten lei it \\< a s ti i le: h lr.
Francisconi was in fact abusing the policy, as he admitted in a signed statement."). 1 The
principal reasons for dismissing the defamation claim require absolutely no "evidencew eighing'' oi "' 'fact

finding."

• ••:*'.sd in the R ailroad's brief (Br A ppe llee pp 34) I" * ti Francis
alleges the Railroad defamed him in two instances: (ij ai the April 26 meeting when, in
the process of confronting him with his abuse of the "in lieu of" policy, one or more of
i.;~ Kanroaa .. .;;vestigators c a i i d
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between a ci n r ei it R ailroad en lployee ai id a forn lei ei i lployee aboi it"" * - 1 n ' he v 'as fired.
Even assuming these allegations are true, the Railroad would still be entitled to summary
judgment.

]

lt is worth noting that the Coin t's opinion fails to address the fact that the truth of
the alleged defamatory statements is established by Mr. Francisconi's own signed
confession. As explained in the Railroad's brief, Mr. Francisconi's self-serving attempt
to withdraw and contradict his admission of \*Tongdoing must be rejected. See Br.
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Under Utah law, "[t]o state a claim for defamation, [the plaintiff] must show that
defendant^ published the [alleged defamatory] statements concerning him, that the
statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the statements
were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication resulted in
damage." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah App. 1994).
As explained in the Railroad's briefing (Br. Appellee, pp. 35-36), the first alleged
instance of defamation (at the April 26 meeting) fails to support a viable claim because
confronting an employee on a legitimate matter of concern to the Railroad - abuse of the
"in lieu o f expense policy - is clearly privileged. See Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812
P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) ("[A] qualified privilege [to defamation] protects an employer's
communication to employees and to other interested parties concerning the reasons for an
employee's discharge."). The Court's opinion does not address or take into account this
critical and entirely applicable legal defense. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence
that the first alleged instance of defamation involved publication to a third party. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 ("publication to a third party" an essential element
of a defamation claim). At the April 26 meeting, the allegedly defamatory
communication was made by the Railroad's agents directly to Mr. Francisconi, not to any
third party. Thus, the Court's opinion does not address or take into account Mr.
Francisconi's failure to establish two fundamental elements of his claim - lack of
privilege and publication to a third party. The first alleged instance is insufficient to state

5

a prima lucic case o\ defamation.
1 v1

• *.

.- ••

M i

Francisconi has put forth absolute' :

.'• . . a s ; : ./laii,.: * ,av\ Dc.aii;.i Mr.

^

• K: .1

:• 3

the defamatory statement was acting within the course and scope of his employment and
not just for personal motives. See Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156-57
•,. . .
entirely on p *"

•.;...;; •.*.;;... ;*.:_. i- r an employer when an employee acts
,:

'

-

ued

remark was made, it is undisputed that the employee in question (Mr. Haig) had no
involvement in the Francisconi investigation am! u:\r no supervisory responsibilities
. ..rusc

-p.

1 . •. .
*

i%

-

• ••

•

*

".ij-i^vment* OK vj;fl,;e issue was beyomi ih^ course and
•

•

**

•

.

<

.* y

liable in defamation for the alleged personal gossip oi its emplovees. No case law
supports such liability. Indeed, the implications of such a rule would, be absurd,
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of evidence or fact-finding.2

in nis briefing on appeal. Mi hrancisconi argued that the Railroad "excessively
published the defamatory statement u» M: Haig/' "an employee of [the Railroad] w ah no
known connection to the audit." Br. Appellant.. , -1 -is < -uwever, as noted b\ iluRailroad (Br. Appellee, p. 37). this argument was ne\ er raised below and therefore
should not be considered on appeal. See State v. Helnuck. 20'H'• I T ' -." >. {) P.3d : 64.
Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Mr. Haig learned about VI".
Francisconi's termination through any disclosure hv t^tx ^ail^nd The source nf V
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Rehearing is necessary to address these overlooked points of law and fact which
dispose of the defamation claim. Regardless of whether the district court improperly
weighed the evidence in determining the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements, the
defamation claim is still utterly without merit for the foregoing reasons.
III.

The Court Overlooked Key Points of Law and Determinative Undisputed
Facts in Reversing Summary Judgment on Mr. Francisconi's Fraud Claim.
The Court's opinion summarily concludes that the validity of Mr. Francisconi's

fraud claim is also a question of fact that the district court improperly resolved. 2001 UT
App, Tffl 16-17. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court overlooked three critically
important points.
First, a plaintiff bringing a fraud claim has a significantly heightened burden of
proof- a burden that Mr. Francisconi cannot begin to satisfy. Among other things, to
establish fraud the plaintiff must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that [the
defendant] did not intend to perform the alleged promise at the time it was made or that
the alleged misrepresentations were made for the purpose of deceiving [the plaintiff]."
Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1047 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis
added). As explained in the Railroad's brief (Br. Appellee, p. 38 n.13), it is firmly
established that this heightened burden exists at the summary judgment stage as well and
must be taken into account when the court considers whether a jury could reasonably

Haig's knowledge is entirely unknown and cannot be inferred. For all anyone knows,
Mr. Francisconi himself is the source.
7

find for the plaintiff.
This Court has previously held that a plaintiffs "assertions, without more, are
inadequate" to meet the plaintiffs heightened burden in a fraud case. Andalex
Resources, Inc., 871 P.2d at 1047. Yet, a single, overwhelmingly disputed assertion is all
Mr. Francisconi puts forth as proof of fraud, and even that assertion couldn't possibly
amount to clear and convincing evidence of fraud even assuming it were true.
Contradicting every other witness present, Mr. Francisconi baldly asserts that at the April
26 meeting a Railroad employee told him that the "first thing you can do to save your job
is to fill out a statement" confessing wrongdoing. R. 1228 (emphasis added); see Br.
Appellee, pp. 39-40 (discussing fraud issue). Mr. Francisconi provided the statement,
which was indeed a good "first" step, but ultimately it was not enough to save his job.
That is hardly "clear and convincing" evidence of fraud - of a promise made without the
intent to perform or with the intent to deceive. Cf. Andalex Resources, Inc., 871 P.2d at
1047. In fact, as argued more fully in the Railroad's brief (Br. Appellee, pp. 39-40), the
disputed statement is not even a promise at all. Specifying that an act is the "first thing"
one must do to obtain a desired result does not by any stretch constitute a representation
that the act alone ensures the result.3
Thus, the Court's decision fails to take account of the heightened standard of

3

For instance, it cannot be argued that a binding promise arises from telling
someone that the "first thing" he can do to obtain a construction contract is to bid on it.
That would produce absurd results.
8

proof for fraud claims on summary judgment. 2001 UT App, ^j 16-17. The reasoning
of the opinion assumes that a mere assertion by a plaintiff could suffice to establish
fraud, even in the face of substantial contradictory evidence. Id. Respectfully, that is not
the law. Cf. Andalex Resources, Inc., 871 P.2d at 1047. The decision also overlooks the
fact that even assuming the truth of his own disputed assertion, Mr. Francisconi was
never promised continued employment. Mr. Francisconi has no evidence whatsoever of
fraud, much less the requisite clear and convincing evidence.
Second, the Court's opinion overlooks the fact that Mr. Francisconi failed to
present any evidence establishing an essential element of a fraud claim. Not all
misrepresentations amount to fraud - the misrepresentation must be of a "presently
existing material fact." Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67
(Utah 1996) (stating elements of fraud claim); see Br. Appellee, pp. 40-41. The
promised performance or nonperformance of a future act does not qualify as a
representation of a presently existing material fact and thus cannot give rise to a fraud
claim. See Br. Appellee, pp. 40-41. Here, the supposed misrepresentation - that
Mr. Francisconi would not be fired if he signed a confession - did not concern a
presently existing material fact. The alleged promise of continued employment was "a
promised performance of a future act," which is not actionable as fraud. 37 Am. Jur. 2d,
Fraud and Deceit, § 57, p. 88 (1968); see Br. Appellee, pp. 40-41. The Court's decision
fails to address or even acknowledge this dispositive legal point.
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Third, the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no detrimental reliance by
Mr. Francisconi. See Br. Appellees, p. 41. Detrimental reliance is part of a prima facie
case of fraud: "To make fraud actionable, there must be some damage to the plaintiff for
which he seeks recovery." Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 12, ^ 8, 995
P.2d 599. Mr. Francisconi has never even attempted to put forth specific evidence
establishing how he relied to his detriment on the alleged misrepresentation. To the
contrary, the evidence is clear that had Mr. Francisconi refused to sign the statement he
would have been terminated. Under Mr. Francisconi's own allegations, the Railroad
suggested he sign a confession as a "first step" toward retaining his job. Thus,
Mr. Francisconi gave up absolutely nothing in providing the statement. Instead, he
gained the chance - unavailing though it was - of keeping his job. Even if he relied on
an undeserved promise of leniency, his reliance left him no worse off than before. The
alleged reliance was in no way detrimental. See Br. Appellee, p. 41.
A rehearing is necessary to address these overlooked points of law and fact. Mr.
Francisconi's fraud claim cannot withstand proper scrutiny.
IV.

The Court Overlooked Key Points of Law and Determinative Undisputed
Facts in Reversing Summary Judgment on Mr. Francisconi's Claim for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
As with the defamation and fraud claims, this Court reversed summary judgment

on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, stating that the district court had
improperly weighed the evidence. 2001 UT App, ^ 16-17. However, like the analysis
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of the fraud claim, the Court failed to take account of the "heavy burden" a plaintiff faces
under Utah law "to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress." Maxfield v. North
American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 724 F.Supp. 840, 844 (D.Utah 1989).
As the Utah Supreme Court just recently reiterated:
"Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional
distress and the variability of its causations, the courts have historically
been wary of dangers in opening the door to recovery therefor. This is
partly because such claims may easily be fabricated: or as sometimes
stated, are easy to assert and hard to defend against."
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ^J 25, 21 P.3d
198 (quoting Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961)). Accordingly, a plaintiff
seeking to establish such a claim must set forth evidence of "extraordinarily vile conduct,
conduct that is 'atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Retherford
v. AT&T Communications, 884 P.2d 949, 977 n.19 (Utah 1992) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965)). In a word, the conduct must be "outrageous."
To be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion;
it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. Furthermore, an act
is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortious, injurious, or
malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it
is illegal.
Franco, 2001 UT, \ 27 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Francisconi never satisfied his "heavy burden." He never put forth any
evidence establishing that the Railroad's actions were "extraordinarily vile," "atrocious,"
or revulsive, as opposed to unkind, unfair, or malicious See Br. Appellee, pp. 31-34.
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There is simply no such evidence in the record. At worst, knowing that Mrs. Francisconi
needed a surgery, the Railroad allegedly told Mr. Francisconi that it would not offer him
the Railroad's COBRA coverage if he would not sign a separation agreement.4 As a
matter of law, even if proven true such allegations fall far short of the requisite standard.
As demonstrated in the Railroad's brief (Br. Appellee, pp.32-33), it is well
established that an employer is not required to offer COBRA coverage where an
employee has been terminated for "gross misconduct." See Collins v. Aggreko, Inc., 884
F.Supp. 450, 452-453 (D.Utah 1995). "Gross misconduct" has been held to include
"misappropriation of company funds." Id. The Railroad believed that Mr. Francisconi
had engaged in "gross misconduct" when he misused the expense policy - something he
had expressly admitted in a signed confession - and for a time it contemplated not
offering him COBRA coverage, as it had a legal right to do. Under these circumstances,
the Railroad was legally entitled to inform Mr. Francisconi of its intentions if he chose
not to accept the separation agreement. It is beyond debate that a defendant cannot be
held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for threatening to do what it has
a legal right to do. See Br. Appellee, pp. 32-33 & n.10 (citing numerous cases). And
again, the Railroad did in fact offer Mr. Francisconi COBRA coverage.

4

It is undisputed that the Railroad in fact offered COBRA coverage and that, after
some temporary confusion with the hospital was cleared up, Mrs. Francisconi obtained
the surgeries she needed. All of Mrs. Francisconi's medical expenses were paid in
accordance with the terms of the health insurance policies. See Br. Appellee, pp. 32-33.
12

The effect of this Court's decision is to undermine a significant body of Utah case
law setting the bar very high for emotional distress claims. Utah courts routinely grant
summary judgment on such claims, even where the defendant allegedly acted in an
offensive or immoral way.5 Here, the Railroad acted within its legal rights, not in
outrageous violation of generally accepted standards of decency and morality. See
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992). Whatever the
employee's personal situation, the mere threat of not offering COBRA coverage where
an employee is being terminated for what the law considers gross misconduct does not
remotely rise to the necessary level of outrageousness. 6 To hold otherwise, as the Court
has done, and to do so without any substantive analysis distinguishing the facts at issue
here from those in past cases dismissing such claims, opens up a pandora's box of
potential emotional distress claims. Respectfully, the Court has overlooked or

5

See, e.g., Sperberv. Galigher Ash Co., 147 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987) (lying about
reason for dismissal insufficiently outrageous); Newsome v. McKesson Corp., 932
F.Supp. 1339, 1343 (D.Utah 1996) (discrimination against female employees, including
the plaintiff, who were unwilling to provide sexual favors, calling the plaintiff "old
bitch," orchestrating rumors against the plaintiff, and alleged termination on the basis of
sex, not sufficiently outrageous under Utah law); Jenks v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1708, 1720-22, 1989 WL 226145 (D.Utah 1989)
(racial slurs and jokes, refusal to train, and termination of employment insufficient under
Utah law).
6

Mr. Francisconi's alternative allegation that the real reason he received such bad
treatment from the Raikoad was because he had an affair with his boss's alleged former mistress
is utterly baseless. There is absolutely no evidence in the record (or anywhere else) supporting
such an allegation. It is mere dark speculation that is entitled to no consideration. Any attempt
to use that baseless assertion to bolster Mr. Francisconi's emotional distress claim must be
rejected. See Br. Appellee, pp. 33-34.
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misapprehended the controlling case law and relevant facts in regard to this claim. A
rehearing is necessary to address these errors.
CONCLUSION
The Railroad is not seeking to alter this Court's holding on the breach of contract
claims. However, this Court's decision overlooks critically important legal principles
which, in connection with the undisputed facts, demonstrate that Mr. Francisconi's
defamation, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are without
merit and should not be presented to a jury. The Railroad respectfully requests that its
petition for rehearing be granted so that the Court can address for the first time the issues
raised above.
Dated this ft* day of December, 2001.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Jgm E. Waddoups
Alexander Dushku
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
The undersigned counsel hereby affirm that this petition is presented in good faith
and not for the purpose of delay.
Dated this / ) r day of December, 2001.

KIRTON & McCONKIE

E. Waddoups
Alexander Dushku
Attorneys for Appellee
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